Introduction
Donors have often been criticized for insufficient targeting of foreign aid. In particular, donor selectivity in terms of favouring needy and deserving recipients appears to be weak according to earlier studies such as Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Alesina and Weder (2002) . 1 The typical defence line of donors is that essentially all empirical studies assess aid allocation across countries. The highly aggregate level of recipient countries may disguise that poverty affects large segments of the population within countries whose average income level is well above subsistence levels. Furthermore, the quality of governance may differ within countries so that some local administrations may put aid to productive use, whereas other local administrations do not merit aid.
The geography of foreign aid within recipient countries is largely unexplored territory. 2 Donors typically do not reveal the precise location of their aid projects. However, AidData in collaboration with the World Bank provides a project-and location-specific 1 Several recent studies stress the differences between donors. While some donors allocate aid altruistically according to recipients' need and merit, other donors behave egoistically and use aid as a means to promote their own commercial and political interest (e.g., Berthélemy 2006; Dollar and Levin 2006; Thiele et al. 2007; Claessens et al. 2009 ). Fleck and Kilby (2010) find that the United States placed less emphasis on need for core aid recipients during the War on Terror.
2 Zhang (2004) provides an exception by assessing the allocation of World Bank projects across Chinese provinces. Specifically, Zhang presents OLS regression results based on about 30 provincial observations for the amount of World Bank loans and five possible determinants, including the population and per-capita income of provinces.
database covering on-going projects in various recipient countries. 3 We combine the projectrelated information offered by AidData with the exceptionally rich data reflecting economic, institutional and political conditions available for 620 districts in 28 Indian states and seven Union territories. 4 The case of India is particularly relevant to assess the within-country allocation of aid. The vast country is characterized by striking regional disparities which should have affected the location of aid projects. India is currently classified as a lowermiddle income country by the World Bank and has traditionally been among the major recipients of foreign aid. As a so-called blend country, India is eligible for highly concessional funding by the International Development Agency (IDA) as well as for IBRD loans. . 4 There are data gaps in several respects, however. Consequently, we miss districts in most Union territories and some small states; see below for details. Note also that we do not cover some 30 districts that were created only recently. 5 See: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (accessed: February 2012). 6 For details, see: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1 (accessed: February 2012).
regional differences with regard to governance and stability. Kerala experienced close to 200 riots per million inhabitants in 2006, compared to essentially zero in Punjab. 7 The frequency of riots within Karnataka varied by a factor of four between the districts of Dakshin (South)
Kannada and Uttara (North) Kannada. Hence, our first objective is to assess whether the World Bank adhered to its own insights -according to which aid tends to be more effective in poor environments with better governance (World Bank 1998) -when distributing its projects within India.
Another contribution is that we take spatial considerations into account. We assess whether World Bank projects tend to cluster regionally, either through previous projects encouraging further projects in the same district or through spatial effects, i.e., neighbouring project locations affecting one another. Spatial effects may be expected particularly if poverty and governance conditions are similar in neighbouring districts. At the same time, regional bodies within India may compete for World Bank projects.
We also aim at evaluating the impact of political factors at the state and district level on the location of World Bank projects. Arguably, the distribution of World Bank assistance within India "has been strongly conditioned by states' political clout with the central government, owing to their ruling parties' ties to the central coalition" (Kirk 2005: 287 In addition to political interference in India, we assess at least tentatively whether the allocation of projects is affected by commercial interests of the World Bank's major shareholders. This could be the case if projects were mainly directed to locations preferred by foreign investors and traders. Several studies suggest that multilateral institutions are vulnerable to pressure of major shareholders. Dreher et al. (2009b: 742) find that loans from the International Monetary Fund are "a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favour with voting members of the [United Nations] Security Council."
Likewise, World Bank projects have been directed by major shareholders and funnelled to politically important developing countries (Dreher et al. 2009a ). According to Fleck and Kilby (2006) , the United States influences World Bank lending in pursuit of US commercial (and strategic) interests.
9 Pressure of shareholders may also affect the within-country allocation of World Bank projects, notably when specific regions are of particular commercial interest.
To preview our major results, the evidence of needs-based location choices across Indian districts by the World Bank is very weak, even though projects tend to concentrate in relatively remote districts. Institutional conditions matter insofar as project locations cluster in districts belonging to states with greater openness to trade. We do not find any evidence that location choices are affected by political patronage at the state or district level. However, the World Bank prefers districts where foreign direct investors may benefit from projects related to infrastructure. 
Method and data
As described below our independent variables include both district-and state-level variables.
To avoid underestimating the standard errors of state-level variables we cluster them by state.
In the basic Poisson model, the dependent variable is defined as the number of project locations within one particular Indian district for all World Bank projects approved during the period 2006-2011. The sample of World Bank projects tends to be tilted increasingly towards longer-term projects the further one goes back in time by including projects approved in earlier years. This is why we focus on recent years, i.e., projects approved in 2006-2011. 12 The cross-section approach appears appropriate to avoid an excess of zeros. Nevertheless, we perform two sets of panel data analyses in subsequent steps in order to test for the robustness of our results. First, we slice the project data by the year of approval. The dependent variable is then defined as the number of project locations for World Bank projects approved in year t (t = 2006, …, 2011) . Second, we consider the number of project-specific locations within a district; i.e., we replace the time dimension by the finer project dimension. Note that the number of zero observations increases substantially when defining the dependent variable along the project dimension.
In both the cross section analysis and the panel data analysis we perform two sets of estimations. The first set includes district-and state-level determinants of location choices.
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The second set includes district-level determinants with state fixed effects to fully control for unobserved heterogeneity at the state level. District-level indicators of need and merit are as 11 Note also that the PPML estimator allows for over-and under-dispersion, i.e., the conditional variance of the dependent variable does not have to be equal to the conditional mean (see e.g., Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006 (accessed February 2012) . This source does not cover six Union territories, Gujarat, and some small states such as Goa, Nagaland, and Tripura. Therefore, we also experimented with an alternative indicator of need drawn from the Indian Census by interpolating data of 2001 and 2011 on district-level literacy rates. However, literacy proved to be irrelevant throughout at conventional levels of significance so that we do not report detailed results. The poor results for literacy rates are probably because social services such as education and health play a minor role in the World Bank's project portfolio in India (see Appendix A). 15 More precisely, the variable may vary between zero and one to account for the possibility that the Chief Minister has her constituency in the district for only part of the period of observation (with the proportion on months used as weights In extended specifications, we account for the spatial lag of the dependent variable.
Rather than considering only neighbours with a common border, we also account for project locations in districts without a common border. Technically speaking, we apply a rowstandardized inverse distance matrix based on distances between Indian districts as our weighting matrix. 20 However, Poisson estimations augmented by spatial lags may be biased due to the endogeneity of spatial lags which tend to be determined simultaneously with project locations in the district under consideration. Therefore, we also present spatial autoregressive models with spatial autoregressive disturbances (SARAR models) estimated by general spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998):
17 Delhi, Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Patna, Bhubaneswar and Guwahati. We thank Henry Edward Jewell and Hyoung Gun Wang of the World Bank's Finance, Economics and Urban Department who developed this measure, as well as Uwe Deichmann who helped us access these data.
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The relevant information is taken from maps revealing the affected districts; see: http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/tsunami-in-india/tsunami-affected-area-india.html. 19 These projects, too, were still active as of September 2011. 20 We use the average distance between districts in neighbouring states as the cut-off distance, i.e., we neglect districts which are further than 489 kilometres away from the district under consideration and set the respective weights to zero.
where Wy is known as the spatial lag with W being the row-standardized inverse distance matrix, X the exogenous regressors, u an disturbance term which may depend on a weighted average of other disturbances and ε an independent but heteroskedastically distributed error term. The method uses WX and W 2 X as instruments. 
Results

Cross section results
The Poisson estimations reported in Table 1 Compared to Tables 1 and 2 , we extend our period of observation in Table 3 It is only in one respect that the results reported in Table 3 differ considerably from those in Tables 1 and 2 . The tsunami dummy is now statistically significant at the ten per cent 29 Kochhar et al. (2006) argue that state-level policies and institutions increasingly mattered in the aftermath of the reform program of the early 1990s. 30 Redefining the dependent variable in this way implies that clustering at the district level, proxied in Tables 1  and 2 by the number of project locations approved in 2001-2005, can no longer be observed. 31 The results may also be affected if our independent variables have less predictive power for earlier location choices. This is unlikely to be the case for variables that do not vary, or just slightly, over time.
level or higher in all estimations with both district-and state-level variables included (columns I-V). The same applies for the estimations with state fixed effects (columns VI-VIII). The stronger evidence for location choices being influenced by the tsunami is not surprising. It indicates that the World Bank reacted promptly by approving projects and locating them where emergency relief was most urgently required.
Apart from emergency relief, the evidence for a needs-based allocation of World Bank support continues to be weak in Table 3 . Again, lower GDP per capita at the district level is associated with more project locations only in the fully specified model with both district-and state-level variables (column V). In the estimations with state fixed effects, it is only the significantly positive coefficient of (logged) distance that may provide some indirect evidence for a needs-based allocation. Compared to Table 1 , the role of institutional and policy conditions at the state level proves to be stronger for the larger sample of World Bank projects. Typically, openness to trade enters highly significant and positive, suggesting that districts in states with better conditions are preferred project locations. Table 3 corroborates that World Bank projects tend to concentrate in districts with clusters of FDI, while political patronage does not appear to matter.
In the final step of our cross section analysis, we account for the spatial lag of the dependent variable. 32 As noted before, large World Bank projects, notably in the field of physical infrastructure, often cover various locations. We expect that a district's chances to attract (parts of) projects improve with the number of project locations in neighbouring districts. In columns I, III and V of Table 4 , we simply augment the corresponding Poisson estimations in Tables 1 and 2 by spatial lags as defined above. In addition, we present SARAR models estimated by GS2SLS in columns II, IV and VI in order to account for the endogeneity of spatial lags. 32 In contrast to 36 We report estimations with and without spatial lags. Columns II, IV and VI clearly indicate the importance of spatial lags for location choices. 37 However, the inclusion of spatial lags has typically limited effects on our variables of major interest. Table   5 corroborates several of our previous findings. First, the number of project locations increases with the size (in terms of population) of districts, while districts in larger states are again penalized. Second, the number of project locations is higher in districts hosting more FDI projects. This finding supports the view that the World Bank responds favourably to demands, e.g., for better infrastructure, by foreign investors and local authorities. All the same, the estimations with fixed state effects attest that the World Bank is more strongly engaged in remote districts.
35 See Appendix C for those variables that had to be interpolated. 36 Compared to previous tables, we reduce the number of specification and focus on the fully specified estimations for the sake of brevity. 37 Note that SARAR models cannot be applied in this context as the used command spreg is not suitable for panel data. This implies that we do not account for the endogeneity of spatial lags here and in Table 6 below.
Third, we again find no evidence for political patronage at either the state or the district level. Fourth, 
Summary and conclusion
Aid allocation studies typically stop short of assessing the targeting of foreign aid according to the need and merit within recipient countries. Recent efforts by AidData, in collaboration with the World Bank, help explore the geography of on-going World Bank projects. We combine the location-specific information for projects in India with the exceptionally rich data reflecting economic, institutional and political conditions in Indian states and districts to assess the allocation of aid within one of the major recipient countries of World Bank support.
We perform Poisson estimations across Indian districts, supplemented by panel data specifications. We also augment the models by spatial lags and account for their endogeneity by using spatial econometric techniques (SARAR models estimated by GS2SLS). Our major results can be summarized as follows. First of all, the evidence of needs-based location choices across Indian districts by the World Bank is very weak, even though activities tend to concentrate in relatively remote districts. Second, spatial lags prove to be significant and positive, indicating that the chances of districts to participate in aid projects improve when the World Bank is active in neighbouring districts. Third, institutional conditions matter insofar as project locations cluster in districts belonging to states with greater openness to trade and fewer riots. However, there is no longer any evidence for a merit-based aid allocation in the panel data analyses. Fourth, we do not find any evidence that location choices are affected by political patronage at the state or district level. On the other hand, the World Bank prefers districts where foreign direct investors may benefit from projects related to infrastructure.
These findings could be relevant for the authorities in the recipient country as well as the World Bank. As concerns the former, the importance of spatial lags suggests that remote areas are well advised to join forces when trying to attract aid projects. Local authorities at lower administrative levels may realize that their own influence is limited when it comes to merit-based aid allocation. This could necessitate cooperation with higher levels of the political administration to improve the institutional environment and governance that donors may require to engage locally. However, the present case study is clearly insufficient to conclude that cooperation along these lines between different administrative levels would be more effective in attracting foreign aid projects than political patronage along party lines and by favouring political constituencies.
As concerns the World Bank, the initial quote from The Economist suggests that it will become increasingly important to target poor people. Location choices within recipient countries could be an essential element in this regard. However, we find little evidence that the World Bank favours locations with greater need for aid. This invites the conclusion that the World Bank should adhere to its own insights more strictly than the Indian case suggests it does. In particular, it appears that local needs for aid have to be assessed more systematically in order to render World Bank aid more effective in fighting poverty at the local level. In this context, the Indian case is encouraging as it appears possible for the World Bank to deal directly with state governments and, thereby, avoid political patronage and meddling by the central government.
Finally, the implications of our analysis extend beyond the World Bank as a leading multilateral donor. Bilateral donors face the same challenge of targeting aid not only to poor countries with appropriate governance for aid to be effective, but also to locations within recipient countries where the need for aid is most obvious and local conditions are conducive to a productive use of external support. Progress in mapping the geography of aid projects within recipient countries could provide an important step towards meeting this challenge. It would allow for comparisons between bilateral and multilateral donors in future research.
Deeper insights into the allocation of aid may be gained in particular if location-specific information on aid projects as well as the economic, institutional and political covariates covered an increasing number of donors and recipient countries. 
